| Operation Dewey Canyon, 1969 |
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| Here's The Truth |
| Some Pictures of those on the operation |
In March 1969 the USMC launched Operation Dewey Canyon. CCN ended up
inserting Co A and Co B on top of a Recon Team, with (I think) about two more
Recon Teams inserted. I was sent out, with another Cpt, to be the Liaison
Officer to the 9th Marine Regiment on a hilltop, near the Ashau, called Fire
Base Cunningham. It had a battery of 155mm and about a Battalion of Marines. The
other Cpt and I maintained constant radio contact and acted as radio relay to
MLT-2 - while our location was being frequently plastered by 122mm artillery
fire. The CCN mission was to protect the flank of the 3rd MAR DIV. An NVA
regiment closed in and surrounded the CCN forces. Maj Moore, the S-2, was
inserted as the Task Force commander. They started a breakout attempt, to walk
back to friendly lines, with a Recon Team on point ... it was wiped out. There
was some pretty heavy fighting. During one fight, Cpt Gary Jones was on the
radio with me when he said "I am Whiskey India Alpha!!" Then, he continued on
with the operation and was later extracted, but not killed. By the way, SOG also
inserted a platoon from OP34 up at Monkey Mountain, commanded by Dick Meadows,
off on the (I think Northern) flank to pull the NVA away from our two companies.
Dick and his folks then walked out and linked up with a USMC unit at some
hilltop, which then marched overland to another USMC firebase for extraction.
We finally extracted the whole operation. With a company being inserted on a
ridge line across the valley from our location at Firebase Cunningham. We were
socked in most of the time (for about 2 weeks) and they were out of food. I
managed to get the USMC to donate some C Rations and had them flown over to our
company across the valley, during one of the rare breaks in the clouds. Finally,
the weather broke enough to get us all out of the area - still under 122mm fire.
(Filed by Col. Randy Givens).
The support of USMC Operation Dewey Canyon went this way: Jack Deckard was the
MLT commander at Quang Tri. Because of the close coordination required with the
USMC, Jack Isler decided to go to the MLT, and took me as his CCN Ops officer to
the site. Moore went in with the 2 companies, commanding the ground unit, and
Gary Jones was his XO. The 2 companies, referred to here after as "Battalion or
bn," got spooked by NVA making noises that had unearthly connotations to the
Bhuddist and animistic troops. The Americans were not able to get the troops
moving in spite of Jack Isler's prodding to Moore. The battalion was in danger
of being
surrounded by the NVA. Isler saw Dick Meadows training a recon team from CCS,
for insert into a target the next day. Isler talked to Meadows, and
re-prioritized his mission. Meadows and his team were to be inserted to the
south of the Battalion, to create diversions to convince the NVA that we had
inserted a large force to relieve the Battalion. I coordinated with the Marine
Regt in our sector, regarding the insert of this team, and that upon
accomplishment of the mission, the team, under command of Meadows, would cross
friendly lines in their sector. I briefed and assigned 3 of our CCN officers,
including Randy Givens to the Marine units on line. This was done to insure a
smooth reentry of the Meadows team. USMC had a strong distrust of indigenous
troops. Meadows diversion had the desired effect, and some immediate pressure
was taken off the battalion.
Moore called in that he had taken casualties including an American. We ginned up
a medevac, loaded extra water, rations and ammo aboard. The medevac got into the
site, under fire. When the slick RTB'd, Moore and Gary Jones got off the slick.
I asked where the wounded were. Jones had a bandage above his left eye, and he
said he was the one. The battalion was left under the command of a young LT,
can't recall his name at this time. I never saw Jack Isler so angry. (NOTE: Both
were ultimately relieved and reassigned out of CCN.) Meadows unit reentered USMC
lines due to the EXCELLENT coordination by the LNOs with the forward units of
the USMC.
While this was under way, GEN Richard Stillwell, CG XXIV Corps choppered in to
MLT 2. He was briefed and then told his aide to get CH 47s up to assist with the
extraction of the Bn. When the CH 47s arrived, we briefed the crews, and the CWO
who was lead, info med us he could not fly the CH 47s into Laos under any
circumstance. He was correct, but GEN Stillwell then had his aide call the
Marine Air Group Cdr, to send CH 46s to do the job. Short version, they did,
took several hits while extracting the bn, and a couple of US and indigenous
were wounded. They brought them back to a hill top in SVN. The CH 47s then
airlifted them back to a more secure location. [filed by Maj William 'Bill"
Shelton]
By: Rod Burns, Col, US Army (Ret)
A little over a year ago, a friend of mine
who served with me in CCN, Robert (Frenchy) Segool, sent me a copy of Thom
Nicholson's book 15 Months in SOG. I was revolted when I read how he distorted
many actual events, placed himself in actions where he never was, warped the
true stories of dear friends of mine (like Pete McMurray), and generally
butchered the truth and reality with his guts and glory "war story". When I
told Frenchy how I felt he said I should write something that told how it really
was. I just kind of blew that off at the
time. Then I stumbled across your excellent web site MACV-SOG. When I read the
story submitted by Randy Givens and Bill Shelton on Dewey Canyon, I felt
compelled to write something about that from the perspective of someone who was
on the ground. The results are submitted in the attached document. As you can
see, it took me an entire year to write it. That is because writing it was a
painful experience for me. I would write a page or two and the memories would
come flooding back. I couldn't sleep or concentrate on anything else, so I
would put the work aside, sometimes for a month or two, but inevitably come back
to it. Well it is finally finished, in a way. Truth is, I've decided to expand
it into a book about all of my memories of CCN, and, if nothing else, it will be
a memoir I will pass on to my children. However, I have formatted the attached
as a stand-alone article, which you may or may not find of interest. If you can
use it, fine, if not pitch it in file 13, but I would appreciate hearing your
thoughts on it. If you don't have Microsoft Word on your computer you may not
be able to open the attached, if so, please get a hold of me and I will resubmit
it as a primary e-mail. Thank you for your consideration.
Rod Burns, Col, US Army (Ret)
Dewey Canyon was an operation in Vietnam that involved at
least a Division of Marines, which took place in February and March 1969. I
think the mission was to destroy all NVA forces between Khe Sanh and the Ashau
Valley. This is not to be confused with the much more publicized Dewey Canyon
II which took place in 1971. In that operation a South Vietnamese Corps,
heavily supported by U.S. forces attacked into Laos west of Khe Sanh and had
their ass handed to them.
At the time I was a 1st Lieutenant and platoon
leader of 1st platoon, A Co (Hatchet Force), CCN, Captain Michael
Miller, Commanding. Actually, the term Hatchet Force had been changed to
Exploitation Force by that time. As part of the reorganization of MACV-SOG?s OP
35 into CCN, CCC, and CCS in January 1969, word came down that the term Hatchet
Force was politically incorrect, thus the change in name. MACV-SOG was an
organization that conducted covert operations in Southeast Asia. The largest
element of SOG was OP-35? which consisted of Command and Control North (CCN) in
Danang, Command and Control Central in Kontum, and Command and Control South in
Ban Me Thout. US Army Special Forces volunteers who led indigenous forces,
primarily Nungs, and Montagnards, manned OP-35. The primary mission of OP-35
was to conduct cross border reconnaissance in Laos code named Prairie Fire, and
Cambodia code named Salem House.
On February 21st I was alerted for a Prairie
Fire mission in support of Dewey Canyon. The next three days were hectic. The
mission kept changing, initially a primary mission, then backup, and again
primary. First just a platoon, then two platoons, then a company. Then there
was the preparation, the briefings, planning, checking equipment, supplies and
preparation of packaged resupplies. Fortunately I had a great platoon sergeant,
SFC Ralf Hawkins. He was a hardened and savvy combat veteran, a black man, lean
and muscular, hard as nails and highly efficient. Every time I see a Lou
Gossett movie, I think of him. He?s the one who got the platoon ready while I
went through the endless briefings and changes. Even the location for the
mission changed. Initially the target area was in Laos south of Khe Sanh where
the Laotian border makes a sharp bend back to the northeast in the shape of a
fishhook. I forget the alphanumeric target designator, but I did get to make an
aerial recon of the target. I went up with covey in the little push-me pull-me
job that I think was called an OV-1. I managed to find a primary and alternate
landing zone (LZ), and puked a couple of times, all for naught. When we finally
launched, the target had changed to Ashau-4 (AS-4), some 25 miles south of
there.
On February 24th we moved two platoons lock
stock and barrel to MLT-2 (Mobile Launch Team) at Quang Tri. On the 25th
it was decided that the mission would be a reconnaissance in force with Company
A and a Recon Team (RT). The morning was filled with briefings at echelons
above God. There were at least two Marine Corps generals in attendance and if I
remember right, neither of them thought much about CCN, and especially our
indigenous forces. My platoon had 35 men. Only six of us were Americans, SFC
Hawkins, three squad leaders, a medic and myself. The rest of the platoon was
Nung (Vietnamese of Chinese ancestry, and good fighters).
The target area was, as I said before, AS-4. About 30
kilometers south of the fish hook, the Laotian border takes a sharp turn
straight to the east for ten or fifteen kilometers and then south again along
the Ashau Valley. The center of the target box was about halfway east along
that turn and south into Laos about 6 kilometers. A high mountain ridge
paralleled the border running from west to east and ending precipitously at the
northern end of the Ashau Valley. We were to go in on the south side of that
mountain ridge, move north across the ridge and toward the South Vietnamese
border. The Marines had established fire support base Cunningham, about five or
six klicks (kilometers) inside Vietnam, north of the Laotian border. AS-4 was
within range of their 155mm guns and they would be our primary artillery fire
support.
Weather was lousy, but there appeared to be a break and
we launched at 1400 hours on the 25th of February on Ch-34 Kingbees.
Here I must digress a little to clear up a few things. If I were telling you
about this strictly from memory, I would have said we launched in UH-1?s,
however, I know that my memory is fallible so I rummaged around some stuff I?ve
kept all these years and found a carbon copy of an after action report that I
wrote in 1969. It is clear from the report that we inserted on Kingbees, and
many of the dates and such in this account come from that report.
There was only enough lift for my platoon. The rest of
the company would have to come in on subsequent lifts. We headed for the target
area and, sure enough, things turned to shit real quick. The weather closed in
and we had to divert to Phu Bai for refueling and then another try. This time
the clouds broke, the sun came out and the verdant jungle mountains of the Ashau
Valley and Laos, vibrant with color, spread out beneath us. It was absolutely
beautiful and so hard for me to comprehend all the death and destruction that
had transpired in that lush landscape. This was my first time ?over the fence?,
as cross border operations were commonly referred to, and as we crossed the
Ashau and closed on the Laotian border my pucker factor went sky high and I
forgot the majestic panorama.
We were high, probably even out of range for 35mm
anti-aircraft fire, but as we crossed the border that changed. We started a
rapid descent toward the LZ, which by the way, had been selected by map
reconnaissance by the S-3 (operations officer), and we were soon racing through
the sky not far above the triple canopy. At this point I couldn?t have told you
where I was or whether we were anywhere near the designated LZ, nor do I think
the pilots knew. Suddenly, we banked hard right and headed for an area along
the slope that was a paler shade of green than the surrounding forest. It looked
to be two or three hundred meters wide and maybe five hundred meters long
running uphill south to north. About the time I decided it was an open field I
heard three or four crack-pop sounds. I thought it might be the rotor blades
changing pitch, but was told later that we were taking small arms fire. I was
also wrong about the open field. As we descended the shimmering pale green of
the field started to undulate like the ocean sea. We were descending into a
growth of young bamboo maybe ten to 15 feet high.
Abruptly the H-34 came to a hover and the pilot signaled
for us to get out. I looked down to the ground about 12 feet below me and shook
my head signaling him to go lower. He just shook his head no and pointed us out
the door again. I wasn?t about to jump, with all my gear I probably weighed
close to two hundred-fifty pounds; I would have broken every bone in my body.
As it was there was only one thing to do, I turned over on my belly and eased
myself out the door thinking to hang below the chopper and reduce my drop to
about six feet. There ain?t no skid on an H-34 though, and as my belly cleared
the edge of the door, with my M-16 in one hand and my other scrabbling for some
kind of finger hold, gravity took over and I hurtled to the ground to land on my
left thigh with an unceremonious thud. The rest of the men on my lift followed
my example and we were all soon deposited in a heap. The rest of the insertion
went the same way; only the platoon got separated into three different areas
that might as well have been miles apart for all I knew.
Miraculously only one SCU (an acronym pronounced ?Sioux?
for special commando unit that we called our indigenous soldiers) broke a leg
and the H-34 he was on waited around long enough for the men to trample down the
bamboo so the helicopter could get lower and take him back out. Some of the
H-34?s had taken more fire than others and one turned back with one of my squad
leaders and five SCU. It seemed like it took hours, but it probably only took
about 15 minutes for the platoon to find each other and consolidate. My platoon
now numbered 28 men, having lost the 6 on the chopper that turned back and the
SCU with the broken leg. It was ominously quiet, we couldn?t see ten feet in
front of us for the bamboo, and the sun was shining. I felt exhilarated, young
and dumb as I was. Sure, we had taken fire, but the rest of the company was on
the way and I felt like we could lick the world. We were ?over the fence?.
Things took a shitty turn real quick. Covey had been in
the area for our insertion and was still on station. Before I could even deploy
the platoon to secure an LZ for the company, let alone cut, break or trample the
young bamboo, Covey called with bad news. The weather had closed in again
between us and the MLT and the returning H-34?s had been diverted (probably to
Khe Sanh). The rest of the company would not be coming that day and I was to
continue the mission. I wasn?t sure what that meant, whether to continue making
and securing an LZ or to do something. I finally decided that we should proceed
with the recon in force. I put my best squad on point; I think the squad
leader?s name was SSG Charles Gray. SGT Lee was our medic and I put him in
charge of what there was of the squad that had lost the squad leader and 5 SCU.
They were second in line of march, and the third squad brought up the rear. I
followed the first squad with my radio operator and interpreter and SFC Hawkins
was behind the second squad. We began moving north, up the mountain in a platoon
column. Flank security was impossible because we had to hack and trample our
way through the young bamboo that was so thick you couldn?t see a man ten feet
away.
As we moved, the vegetation began to change. Every now
and then we would break into a grassy open area that afforded us a view of the
world around us. What a view it was. To our north about 1000 meters was the
top of the mountain ridge looming dark green, almost black, on the horizon. To
the west about one or two klicks along the ridgeline a limestone escarpment
shining almost pure white in the sun reached up, probably a hundred feet, to a
plateau that ran to the west. It looked like an impregnable citadel jutting
into a bright blue sky.
Soon we were in a more mature bamboo growth with some
other small trees scattered throughout. It was here that the point alerted. I
moved forward. The point man had heard voices and movement to our front.
Cautiously we continued to move, this time I was at the front with only two SCU
in front of me. It was a foolish thing for me to do, as I would soon find
out.
The bamboo retreated and we were moving in young
relatively open forest and the terrain leveled off somewhat to a bench like
area. The farther uphill we moved the larger the trees became, and then there
was a deep gully on our left and a path that went north up the mountain along
the gully. Another stupid blunder, we followed the path.
We had been moving for about an hour, and it had been at
least thirty minutes since the point had alerted. The adrenalin had ceased
flowing and my mind started to wander. The vegetation opened up and the opposite
wooded ridgeline about 50 to 75 meters across the gully came into full view. I
was in the open with just some scattered smaller trees along the path. I was
thinking how much this spot looked like a place I vaguely remembered as a child.
The noise! An ungodly roar falling a little tree to my
left. My finger repeatedly pulling the trigger of my rifle. My face slamming
into the ground. Stuff falling on me, little stuff. Leaves, bark, stuff.
Nausea, my bowels feeling like they were filled with water. Every nerve
shrinking, every pore tingling in anticipation of objects penetrating,
violating. I?m on my belly, I?m turned around, I?m slithering along the forest
floor like a black racer. And then, there is Hawkins, above me, yelling at me.
What is he saying? ?Lieutenant, are you all right?? I am convinced that there
are no words in human dialect that can describe such consuming all encompassing
fear.
I had led us into an ambush. The clearing along the path
was about 50 meters long. It was the kill zone of the ambush and I had been
right in the middle of it when the NVA opened fire. Now I was huddled beside the
reassuring mass of SFC Hawkins, not knowing what to think or what to do. I
think I finally answered his query with a nod, but now, paralyzed by fear, I
really had no idea whether I had been hit or not. I hadn?t. God really looks
out for fools. The roar had by now become recognizable gunfire. The firing had
slowed but some AK-47?s were still firing on automatic, others on semi. Their
sharp clatter was joined by the deeper staccato of at least one RPD machine
gun. These sounds will be instantly recognizable to me to my dying day. The
two SCU who had been in front of me had vanished. Behind me the terrain fell
off to the east, away from the gully, so only about two of my men up by me could
return any fire, and they were doing that.
I might not have known what to do, or even been capable
of doing anything at that point, but Hawkins did. He shouted above the roaring
to get an M-79 grenade launcher up front, and then directed the gunner to fire
two rounds into the offending noise across the gully. As soon as the first one
exploded he had the platoon up and making a beeline back down the ridge to that
wooded bench we had crossed about 150 meters to the rear. Of course, I
instantly overcame my paralysis and joined him in the dash back down the
mountain. Within minutes Hawkins had a defensive perimeter established. I still
can?t believe how calm he was.
Hawkins came over to where I was trying to make myself
very small behind a large tree and told me we had to get some artillery in
quick. I had now regained enough composure to comply when I suddenly remembered
the two SCU who had been in front of me. They were still up there somewhere.
Then I did something that just added to the list of stupid things I?d been
doing. My place was with the platoon and to be in a position to bring whatever
assistance to us that I could through our fragile communications link to the
world. Instead I told Hawkins to wait on the artillery because I was going back
up after those two men. It certainly wasn?t courage that drove me to do that;
rather it was pure unadulterated guilt. I had taken them into that ambush and
then I had abandoned them.
SSG Gray had been maintaining contact with the point with
squad radios. I think they were PRC-8?s, curved rectangular black boxes about
15 inches long that resembled oversized telephone handsets. They had strictly
line of sight range, if you were near sighted, so we had lost radio contact as
soon as we came back down the mountain. I think I told Hawkins to wait 15
minutes and if I wasn?t back to call in the artillery.
I remembered I had been firing my rifle and thought I had
fired most of the rounds in the magazine, so I changed it for a full one. Later
when I reloaded the magazine, I discovered I had only fired five rounds.
Remarkable when you consider that in the milliseconds it had taken me to fall
from an erect dream world that I had been in to my face smashing into the earth,
I had somehow moved the selector switch on my rifle from safe to semiautomatic
and squeezed the trigger five times. Then I took Gray?s squad radio and my
interpreter and started back toward the ambush location. Every few seconds my
interpreter would try to contact the missing men on the radio as we cautiously
crawled and crept forward. Gut wrenching fear gripped me but I forced myself
on. About half way back to the ambush site my interpreter made contact with the
missing men on the radio. Seconds later two furtive figures came at us through
the brush. It was them, and we were soon back in the perimeter.
My call for artillery was another fiasco. When we had
been inserted we had no radio contact with Cunningham fire support base because
the mountain ridge blocked our line of sight. Covey had been our only link to
friendly forces, but covey was no longer on station. Fortunately we were now
close enough to the top of the ridge and we were able established contact
directly with the artillery.
Covey had given me a fix (map coordinate location) at our
LZ, but I now had no certainty of our location. Dozens of fingers came south
off that mountain ridge and we could have been on any one of three or four of
them. To be safe I decided to adjust fire by calling for artillery at a set of
map coordinates that I knew we were not at, and them adjust from a gun target
line. In other words, if I asked for them to adjust right or left it would be
from the direction the 155 guns were pointed in. I chose the initial
coordinates on top of the mountain ridge, which was still about 300 or 400
meters north of us.
When the first shell came in, if I hadn?t been so scarred
as I was at that point, I would have been embarrassed. It exploded so far away
from us to the northeast that we could barely hear it. Awkwardly, I called in a
new set of coordinates about a klick to the west. That shell also exploded far
off, this time to the northwest, but close enough to adjust on. I think I
called for them to adjust over 200 and left 200, then held my breath and prayed
that I hadn?t called it in on my platoon. The shell exploded about 300 meters to
the northwest, at least 150 meters beyond the ambush site, but I figured that
was good enough and called fire for effect. The NVA, I am sure were long gone
from the ambush site so one place was as good as another. I?m sure that we
killed a lot of trees with that fire mission, so when the marine artillery
called back for target results I told them they were right on target and broke
up an NVA platoon size formation.
It was getting late in the day and would soon be dark.
We were in a good defendable position, but still far enough south of the ridge
where our communication with Cunningham was weak. Hawkins and I decided to try
for the ridge top to RON (remain overnight). We moved out in the same formation
as before, only this time with me in the right position, and worked our way to
the top. This time we gave the path along the gully a wide berth to the east.
As we crested the ridge an entirely different landscape
lay before us. It was an area of gigantic trees that rose a hundred feet and
more to a thick canopy that blocked out nearly all light. Some of those trees
were six feet in diameter or more. Huge monolithic boulders were scattered
about like some titan had dropped them on the ground haphazardly. There was
little vegetation on the forest floor because the sunlight couldn?t penetrate.
The mountain ridge was quite flat and 200 or 300 meters wide in most places.
Trails crisscrossed the area and one very well worn path went west to east
through the middle. It was obvious that lots of people had been going back and
forth in that area.
Hawkins located a good position and got the platoon into
a defensive perimeter just as it got completely dark. It was time to take
stock. We had been shaken by the ambush, but we had no casualties. We had good
communications and plenty of ammunition. We were getting low on water as we had
found none to replenish our canteens and most would be out by morning. I was
queasy about that well used trail. It was obvious that there were a lot more
NVA in the area than there were of us, but the rest of the company would join us
in the morning, I thought, so we would be alright.
We also had the Blackbird on station. That was a very
specially equipped C-130 aircraft that over flew the trackless, jungle mountains
of Laos almost continuously, maintaining communications with various forces,
including us, that our national political establishment denied being there.
Their call sign was Hillsborough during the day and Moonbeam at night. Moonbeam
was sure reassuring that night and even kicked out an aerial flare now and then
when we heard, or thought we heard movement around us. Although the flares
didn?t pinpoint our location to the NVA, it surely gave them the general area.
Not that it mattered, after that late afternoon ambush; the NVA had a pretty
good idea where we were anyway. I did not sleep that night.
As dawn approached on the 26th of February,
stand-to came and went. Stand-to is when you get everybody ready just before
first light, when the enemy horde is most likely to attack. Light came slowly
because of a heavy overcast and we were under those giant trees, which didn?t
let very much light in anyway. Soon water started to drip on us from that
closed canopy. It was raining somewhere up there, but the trees were as
reluctant to let the rain in as the light. That didn?t make me feel very good
because it dimmed the chances of a quick link up with the rest of the company.
My fears were soon confirmed when I got a call from Cunningham. A liaison
officer from MLT-2 had been sent to Cunningham to provide a link between the CCN
command group and operational forces on the ground. He informed me that the
weather still precluded a launch of the rest of the company from MLT-2. I think
he passed on instructions for us to remain in place in the hope that the company
would be able to launch later in the day.
Late that morning the NVA found us. The squad leader on
the northeast portion of the perimeter reported movement and voices to his
front. I braced for all hell to break loose, but nothing happened. A deadly
game was being played out. I got my interpreter over there because the squad
could hear the enemy talking. Two or three enemy soldiers had approached the
perimeter and stopped just out of sight and were talking to each other. What
they were saying was that the Americans were nearby and that they had better get
out of there before they got caught, then they blundered back to the northeast
making quite a racket. Obviously they wanted us to come after them. When we
didn?t move, some time went by and then they came back and tried it again.
Their boldness unnerved me. Somewhere to the northeast was a well-prepared
ambush, and there must have been a large force to directly challenge us like
that.
Some time after noon we got word that there was no chance
for the rest of the company to come in that day. We were to continue the
mission. I?d figured out by now that that meant do something. I wasn?t about
to lead the platoon to the northeast, so after talking things over with Hawkins,
we decided to go west until we found a promising finger dropping off the
mountain to the north.
We moved out as quietly as possible, working our way west
along the northern rim of the ridge and continuously watching our back trail. I
think we tried to move down a finger to the north but it ended abruptly,
dropping precipitously into dense forest below, so we had to backtrack and try
again. Two or three hundred meters to the west we finally found a finger that
seemed to go where we wanted to go. As we moved down the finger, the diameter
of the trees got smaller, but it was still relatively open under the forest
canopy.
I think everyone was out of water by then. It was still
overcast and drizzling, but we were starting to get dehydrated. When we would
find a small copse of bamboo now and then we would cut small pieces and chew on
it. I provided some moisture and a little relief for our thirst.
Late in the afternoon the finger we were on petered out.
I could see quite a ways through the forest. To our left was a deep gorge.
Across the gorge, about 150 meters was a high broad ridge that ran down to the
northwest. That?s probably the ridge we should have been on. The forest
dropped off to our right and than rose again somewhere in the distance, but
there the vegetation was much thicker triple canopy jungle and you couldn?t see
very far. In front of us the finger we were on dropped sharply down. Far below
we could see a swift rivulet running into the gorge to our left. On the other
side of the stream was a low finger coming from the east and ending in the
gorge. Over that finger another finger rose to the north.
Finally there was water. I was vaguely nervous about how
exposed we were to the ridge to our west, but we had to have water and the
column was soon slipping and sliding down to the stream to our front. I passed
instructions for everyone to stay in a column formation and for each man to fill
his canteen as he crossed the stream and continue moving. We would cross the
finger on the other side of the stream and then move up the next finger to the
north.
The stream was about three feet wide with fast clear
water running over a rocky bottom. As I crossed I filled my canteen, dropped in
a couple of iodine tablets, and shook up the canteen as I continued over the
finger on the other side. Getting water for everyone slowed us down. I was
still behind the first squad, and the platoon was strung out at least a hundred
meters. I was at least 75 meters up the finger that rose to the north when the
last squad was crossing the stream. That?s when the NVA hit us.
The thunderous roar of automatic weapons was deafening.
I recognized AK-47?s, lots of them, and RPDs. Added to the din were the sharp
cracking of our M-16?s returning fire and the deeper punctuation of our M-60
machine gun and the thump of our M-79 grenade launchers. A new sound to me was
the explosions of incoming B-40 rockets as they spattered against the trees
around us, filling the air with thousands of tiny metal shards. The NVA were on
the high ridge about 200 meters to our southwest, and they had us in the open.
Tree bark was flying everywhere and leaves were falling with other debris.
I couldn?t move. I couldn?t think. I didn?t know what
to do. But, Hawkins did. He was running up toward me and as he neared he was
yelling above the din to get the hell up the ridge, get out of this killing
zone. He planted himself about 15 feet below me and to the side, and was urging
everyone past him and up the ridge. That?s when I saw the flashes of light
seeking the ground around him. Machine gun tracer ammunition what drawing a
figure eight around his feet. I screamed at him to move but he ignored the fire
and motioned me up the ridge yelling at me to get up front and find a place we
could defend. I watched him for a few moments, in awe at his calm as the ground
was torn up around him, and then I was running.
It was steep, but I ran harder than I?ve ever run.
Unbelievable fear, but this time, no panic. I had to get to the front of the
fleeing column and get the platoon under control. About 200 meters up the
finger I caught SSG Gray with the first squad. At that point the finger joined
a broad ridge coming down from the southeast. It dropped sharply to the north,
but was relatively level to the east. I couldn?t breath, I couldn?t talk I was
so winded, so I signaled Gray to the east and we ran on. Abruptly the forest
ended and we were in an open field.
I was in a field of waist high grass, which dropped
steeply downhill to the north. The field was about 250 meter wide and tall
dense forest lined its eastern edge. It dropped downhill about 400 meters to a
huge cone shaped hill mass that I could barely make out in the misty overcast
and drizzle. Uphill to my right about 100 meters the hill seemed to level out
in an area of scattered trees. Right where the field started to level off I saw
a dark opening on a small mound. My stomach almost came up in my throat as I
realized I was looking into the mouth of a bunker. There was no firing from
that direction though, only the firing down behind me which was rapidly tapering
off. The bunker area was either unoccupied or the NVA were waiting for more of
us to get in the open.
I had no choice; we had to move up to the bunker area.
It was the only defendable area I could see. I broke right and signaled the
platoon up the edge of the wood line to the bunker. The NVA were not there.
Above the bunker the forest closed in on the sides and the terrain leveled off
somewhat in a relatively open area about 100 meters wide and 100 meters deep.
It wasn?t ideal, but the terrain dropped off into the forest on the east and
west sides, and rose gently through the forest to the south. To the north the
open field dropped steeply in front of the old bunker. It would do.
It was getting dark fast, especially in the drizzling
overcast. Hawkins brought up the rear and herded the exhausted platoon into the
perimeter. It was time to take stock. SGT Lee, our medic who was standing in
as my second squad leader had been hit in the leg. Five SCU had been wounded,
three of them seriously. The worst was that one man was missing. He was a Nung,
and I knew him. He couldn?t have been over 16 or 17 years old, was a cheerful
impish boy with a wide smile and quick laugh. He had been near the end of the
column and was filling his canteen in the stream when we were hit. When the
great roar of gunfire exploded, he had fallen forward face down in the stream
and never moved. His squad members who passed him thought he had been killed
instantly.
Leaving that man has haunted me to this day. I couldn?t
jeopardize the lives of the entire platoon to go back for a man who was probably
dead, but was he? I have often asked myself a very disturbing question. Would
I have gone back for him if he had been an American?
The only possible fire support we could get in that
weather was the 155mm artillery from Cunningham. We soon had a fire mission
going into the gorge where we had been hit by the NVA. If they were trying to
follow us they took a plastering.
The liaison at Cunningham was hounding me to give him a
sitrep (situation) report. I recognized the voice as that of Major Moore, a
senior staff officer from CCN. Trying to get in the artillery, take care of the
wounded and get the platoon into a good perimeter seemed more important to me
than taking the time to give a sitrep. Besides, I was scarred to death and
cold, wet and miserable to boot. Those were the days before we had secure voice
radio, so anything of importance had to be encoded from an SOI (a code book), or
sent by agreed upon brevity code. At the time the brevity code for Americans, I
think, was Straw Hat, and for Indigenous White Hat. In my near panic condition
I sent a short message that said we had 1 White Hat WIA, 5 Straw Hat WIA, and 1
Straw Hat MIA. Of course I?d gotten it completely backward and that really
caused some consternation.
Major Moore asked if I was sure of my report. I said I
was, and then he came back and asked if I was declaring a Prairie Fire. Prairie
Fire had a couple of meanings. That was the code name for the area that CCN
operated in, that portion of Laos 20 to 30 klicks deep, west of the Vietnamese
border and north to where the Ho Chi Minh trail entered Laos from North
Vietnam. It also had a more forbidding meaning. If a recon team or hatchet
force got into trouble so serious that annihilation was imminent, they declared
a Prairie Fire. With that declaration all available firepower, air and ground,
within range of the emergency was immediately diverted to their assistance. If
a Prairie Fire was called lots of people, good guys and bad guys, were going to
die. We had evaded the NVA and were not under immediate attack, so I told him
no, and realizing my error, I corrected my sitrep.
I was so miserably frightened by then, very nearly in
tears, that I reached blindly for help. I think I said, ?Major Moore, what am I
going to do??. There was dead silence for a moment on the radio, and then Major
Moore came back with ?Calm down son, we will get you a medivac in the morning.?
Then he reminded me not to use names on the radio.
I got with Hawkins and we burrowed into a depression
behind a big tree on the eastern side of the perimeter for the night. We should
not have been together because if one of us was hit, the other could take
charge, but I needed him near me then. I wanted to lie beside him and perhaps
some of his calm and courage would seep over into my body. It was a long night
and I didn?t sleep again.
We were all wet and cold. I?m originally from northern
Michigan, but I think I was colder that night than I have ever been. It was
absolutely black. It really was rough on the wounded; especially one of the
Nung?s who had been shot through the stomach. He had to be in horrible pain,
but he never made a sound that night.
During the night we heard clicking noises down in the
draw to our northeast. It may have been the NVA signaling to each other while
trying to find us, or it may just have been wind blowing through the bamboo. At
any rate it kept me on edge. I may not have been able to sleep, but Hawkins
did, and loudly. He would start snoring and to me it sounded like a chain saw.
I was sure every NVA soldier within a mile could hear him. I kept waking him
up, but it did little good as he was soon sawing logs again.
Time for stand-to finally came and we all held our breath
awaiting the assault of the enemy horde, but they did not come. They had not
found us during the night.
I hoped that we would get our wounded evacuated soon and
that the rest of the company would join us. It was not to be. Everything east
of us was still socked in. Still, we had to get a landing zone ready for when
they could come. We went to work clearing the area within our perimeter.
Several small trees were removed using C-4 explosives and we brushed out a
reasonable area for a one ship LZ, however far above us a large branch from a
giant tree hovered out over our LZ. A UH-1 might be able to come in under it
from the north, but it would be tight. Using C-4 on the tree was futile; it had
about a five-foot diameter trunk. One of my squad leaders came up with the
brilliant idea of blowing off the offending branch with a LAW (light antitank
weapon). He tried twice I think, but of course, he missed.
Covey was on station by then and let us know that a CH-46
was on the way to evacuate our wounded. There was no way that a CH-46, a large
twin bladed cargo helicopter, could land in our perimeter, and when it arrived,
our doubt was confirmed. They were going to have to use a jungle penetrater to
extract our wounded. This was a grappling hook like thing that was lowered by
cable and the person being taken out would sit on the forks of the hook and hold
onto the cable while being winched back into the helicopter. Three of our
wounded were serious and would never have been able to hold on while being
winched up a hundred feet or more. SGT Lee went out first and held on to the
most seriously wounded of the Nungs, the one shot through the belly. Then the
two lightly wounded each took another of the more seriously wounded to get the
rest out.
While the wounded were being evacuated, one of my squad
leaders brought me a note that had been dropped from the helicopter. It was
scrawled on a folded piece of paper and it was from Captain Miller. He had
written some encouraging words and assured me that he would be coming with the
rest of the company as soon as possible. His concern moved me and gave me a
little added strength.
Clearing the LZ and getting the wounded out took most of
the morning, and I had no doubt that every NVA soldier within ten miles now knew
exactly where we were. At this point there were just twenty-one of us left. We
had lost a quarter of our strength in the firefight with the NVA the evening
before. With no hope of the rest of the company getting in that day, things
looked very grim. Attack was imminent; it was just a matter of when.
The sun was out and it was very clear. To our north the
mountain dropped off steeply about 500 meters to a large cone shaped hill that
rose abruptly above the surrounding forest. Beyond that about three kilometers
was the South Vietnamese border. There the jungle yielded to undulating hills
stretching north toward Khe Sanh. The colors were vibrant, mostly shades of
green from emerald to almost black. Every so often the shades of green were
broken by slashes of reddish brown where the earth had been exposed. It was
gorgeous. I later found out that the Ninth U.S. Marine Regiment was engaged at
that time in a bloody struggle with the NVA. At about that time, two companies
of marines were virtually annihilated just on the other side of the border to
our north. Dewey Canyon was a costly battle for the marines. I think that that
is where the Ninth Marines had the name ?The Walking Dead? bestowed on them.
Time went inexorably slowly by as we waited for the NVA
to attack. Everyone dug in as well as they could. We didn?t carry any
entrenching tools, so the men dug with knives, canteen cups, sticks and bare
fingers into the concrete hard unyielding earth. We were also very low on
water; most having only gotten one canteen filled in that deadly gorge the day
before. Everyone was exhausted, thirsty and scared. Still the NVA did not
come.
Darkness came and another uneasy night. This time I
slept a little, fitfully, through sheer exhaustion. Again the dawn approached
and still no NVA. That soon changed.
As the sun came up on February 28th, Covey
came on station. Very soon the radios started humming with communications
traffic. Covey had seen something. And then it happened. Covey had declared a
Prairie Fire. By listening to Covey reporting the situation to Cunningham I was
able to piece together what was happening. There certainly wasn?t any other
indication to us, as it was deadly calm and silent around us. Covey had spotted
the NVA massing to attack about 300 to 500 meters from our position. He was
able to count about 300 NVA to our north and west. I tightened up perceptibly
but managed to alert the platoon. Our 21 soldiers huddled in the little holes
we had scratched in the earth on that Laotian mountainside were merely an
irritating bunch of insects about to be crushed by at least a battalion of NVA.
Then the gods of war unleashed their fury on the NVA.
It wasn?t really the gods of war; it was the wrath of the
U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Army, and U.S. Air Force that descended on the NVA. For
several hours, it seemed, the sky was filled with various aircraft and the
deadly ordinance that unmercifully sought out the enemy. Marine 155mm artillery
crashed almost continuously into the mountainside. Army and Marine gunships
came and went expending machine gun, cannon fire and rockets into the enemy. A
flight of Spads, WWII and Korea vintage propeller driven fighter/bombers, came
on station sending cannon fire and bombs into the inferno. They went away and
after a while came back and did it again. Then as kind of a finale to the
carnage, there was a whine, whoosh, roar directly over our heads as a pair of
F-4 Phantom jets came over the top of us flying from east to west. And then
they were gone and there was quiet followed momentarily by crashing, roaring,
repetitive eruptions rising out of the west and engulfing us. The F-4?s had
released their bombs before they were even over us and the bombs had rolled and
tumbled over our heads and ferreted out the desperate enemy in the deadly gorge
to our west. Then there really was silence.
The NVA attack was shattered. We had not seen an enemy
soldier, not had a shot fired at us in anger. Covey had directed the whole show
from somewhere up above. I thought about all of the carnage in the void of the
deadly gorge to our west and the base of that cone shaped hill to our north,
about the hundreds of mutilated, torn, ruptured human beings littering the
forest floor somewhere just out of sight. All I did was thank the good Lord
above that they were dead and we were alive.
There was no more activity the rest of that day. We
remained in a state of high alert, but the response to the Prairie Fire had
broken the back of the NVA. Now we only had the elements to contend with. We
were now all out of water, and no way to get any. Thirst began to work its
debilitating effect on us.
Toward evening the liaison at Cunningham got ahold of me
on the radio. The remnants of the NVA that had attacked us had withdrawn north
and joined the NVA forces that had been fighting the Marines and then pulled
back across the border into Laos. Apparently they were located between the cone
shaped hill to our north and the border. There were estimates of up to three
regiments of NVA in that area. Shortly after dark there would be an Arc Light
in that area, and we were to hunker down and do what we could to protect
ourselves. The B-52?s would be making their run from east to west about 1500
meters to our front.
Darkness came, we got the warning that the mission had
begun and we burrowed as deeply into our scratched out holes as we could. Then
the earth was trembling, shuddering and a long continuous moaning roar enveloped
us. It seemed that the earth trembled for a long time and the noise and
concussion filled my head as I dug my fingers into the dirt to keep from being
extracted from my hole. Then dead silence and blackness of night closed upon
us. In spite of my thirst and terror, I slept a little that night.
With the morning of March 1st came the sun,
clear skies, and good news. Help was on the way. The bad weather to the east
had lifted and long awaited reinforcements were on the way to link up with us.
Not only was Captain Miller with the rest of A Company coming, a whole task
force was on the way. A Company was being joined by B Company of the hatchet
force, commanded by Captain Gary Jones, and two Recon Teams. In all a couple
hundred men would form the task force, and Major Moore had joined them and would
be in command.
Task Force Moore was not as strong as it could have
been. The rest of A Company consisted of two under strength platoons, which
Captain Miller consolidated into one full strength platoon. One of the platoons
was commanded by 1LT Phil Bauso and I felt good about him. He was a law school
graduate, from the Bronx I think, and shortly after he passed the New York bar
examination, he had joined the army and volunteered for Special Forces and
Vietnam. He was a hard charger, always volunteering for the most dangerous
missions, and he was an outstanding platoon leader. Unfortunately he left on R
and R just before the mission and had not yet returned. The other platoon
didn?t even have a platoon leader until a day or two before this mission. A
heavyset Lieutenant named Willard joined Captain Miller at Quang Tri just in
time to accompany Task Force Moore.
Other shortages were to be filled by volunteers. Two of
those volunteer who I remember well were Captain Bobby Blatherwick and SGT
Sanderfield Jones. Bobby was on a six-month extension of his tour of duty and
we had developed a personal friendship. Bobby was a courageous man. Just six
months prior to Dewey Canyon, enemy sappers, had attacked CCN at Marble Mountain
on the 23rd of August, and 17 Americans had been killed. A great
number more Americans and indigenous soldiers had been wounded. Many of the
wounded owe their life to Bobby. Somehow he got to a vehicle and throughout
that hellacious night he had driven around the compound during the fighting to
recover the wounded and get them to medical help. All of the tires on the
vehicle had been flattened by enemy fire before it was over. Bobby would come
along as an extra officer in the Task Force command group. SGT Jones who was
assigned to MLT-2 at Quang Tri volunteered to be one of the consolidated
platoon?s squad leaders in A Company. I have always remembered Sanderfield
Jones for what would happen in the next few days.
The task force came in on the same LZ that my platoon had
been inserted on five days before, and they encountered the same difficulty.
The helicopters off loaded the men 10 to 15 feet above the ground because of the
high bamboo. LT Willard who had only been with the company a day or two broke
his leg and had to be taken back out. That is when Bobby Blatherwick took over
the platoon. I can?t remember if anyone else was lost.
We were told to stay put and that the task force would
link up with us. Covey was again on station and took on the task of guiding the
task force to our location. All we could do was wait. We were in pretty bad
shape by then for lack of water. We still had food as each of us had started
with five days rations, which meant we carried one meal a day for the five
days. What we had though was a mix of long range reconnaissance patrol rations
(lrrps) and the Vietnamese equivalent. The lrrps were dehydrated mixtures of
hash or such and the Vietnamese rations were a mix of rice and dehydrated shrimp
and fish. The problem was that you had to have water to prepare them; so most
of us had only eaten one or two meals in the last five days. We were weak and
terribly thirsty. My lips were cracked and my tongue felt so swollen that it
was difficult to talk on the radio.
Sometime during the day SSG Gray reported that his squad
detected movement south of the perimeter. The task force was still a couple
klicks away so either it was the NVA or some unseen forest creatures moving
nearby. It kept us on edge.
Captain Miller knew what kind of shape we were in and he
pushed hard to try to get to us that day. At one point close to dark he was far
out in front with just his radio operator and then even the radio operator fell
back. Finding himself alone he had to fall back to the task force. About dark
the task force made it to the top of the mountain ridge where they established a
perimeter. We were still 1000 to 1500 meter to the northeast of them, so we
hunkered down for another night.
That night Captain Miller called me on the radio and told
us that the platoon would have to move out and link up with the task force in
the morning. I did not feel very good about the order because we had heard
movement outside the perimeter to the south during the day. That was the
direction we would have to move in the morning. I?m not sure why, but I think
the order was a result of decisions made on what the task force would be doing
after the link up. They did not want to waste any more time coming to us and
then backtracking.
Shortly after dawn on March 2nd we cautiously
moved out of that position that had been our safe haven for the last three days
and nights. Everyone in the platoon was sure that the NVA were waiting for us
and responded accordingly. We moved in platoon column, slowly and stealthily.
We had flank security out as far as possible, and every man continuously
examined every fold in the ground for where he could take cover if we were hit.
We had learned from bitter experience how to move in hostile territory and were
ready to respond to anything. Covey was again on station and guided us toward
the task force. For several hours we worked our way south up to the top of the
mountain ridge, and then turned west moving along the ridge toward the task
force.
Linking up with friendly forces in hostile territory is a
very dangerous task. Frightened men on both sides might mistake the other for
enemy forces and be quick to fire. It may have been even more dangerous for
us. We were dirty, worn and haggard. We wore olive drab jungle fatigues with
no marking at all and floppy boonie hats or just green bandannas tied around the
head to keep sweat out of the eyes. The bulk of our force was indigenous and at
a distance we were probably indistinguishable from the NVA. Really, that was
the idea; the more we looked like the enemy, the greater chance that the enemy
might hesitate for a moment if we ran into them. That would give us a slim
edge. This time, the link up went very smoothly, primarily because First
Sergeant Fisher of B Company came out from the task force perimeter with a
radio, all by himself, and talked us into his position. I was never so happy to
see that lean, wiry, professional noncommissioned officer, as I was that day.
We were really done in and completely dehydrated from
lack of water, so Captain Miller saw to it that the rest of the company divided
what water they had with us. The squad leader and five Nungs that were on the
helicopter that turned back when my platoon was inserted on February 25th
had come in with the rest of the company and now rejoined us. Now I had 27 men
in my platoon. Captain Miller then directed me to put my platoon into the
southwest part of the perimeter, but to be careful because he had already lost
one of the SCU to a mine. Evidently, a Recon Team had been in this position
about a month earlier and had left several mines emplaced. They were toe
poppers, M-14 anti-personnel mines I think. They were small, about as big
around as a tomato soup can, but only about half as tall, and made out of olive
drab plastic. The pressure plate was slightly smaller in circumference, and
when they were dug in, they were nearly impossible to detect. They were not
designed to kill, only to maim, and they lived up to their name. It wasn?t long
before one of my Nung?s stepped on one and shattered his foot. I was terrified,
and I?m sure everyone else in the platoon was too, as we moved into our position
and began scratching out our fighting positions. Every step I took I cringed
with anticipation of the bang and explosion of pain that would announce that I
would be crippled for the rest of my life. Needless to say, once we burrowed
into our position, nobody moved unless they absolutely had to.
The Task Force had planned to move out as soon as we
linked up, but that had changed when the SCU had stepped on the toe popper. Now
one of my Nungs was also wounded and we were waiting for a medevac helicopter.
The perimeter that we were in was located on the southern edge of the mountain
ridge and relatively open. The recon team that had been here about a month
before, the same one that planted the mines, had cleared a small landing zone on
the southeastern part of the perimeter and they had been extracted from there.
This is where the helicopter landed late in the day to evacuate our wounded. By
then it was too late to do much so Major Moore decided to RON where we were.
I was happy with that decision because my platoon was
exhausted and needed the rest. I broke open one of my rations, a lrrp, broke
off a piece of C-4 plastic explosives about the size of the end of my thumb, lit
it with a match and soon had a canteen cup of water boiling. The boiling water
went into the plastic bag of dehydrated hash, or chili, or whatever, and in a
couple minutes it was edible. As darkness approached, Hawkins organized a watch
where one third of the platoon would be alert as the rest slept. I curled up in
my shallow depression and sweet blackness enveloped me, probably more
unconsciousness from exhaustion than sleep.
The wail pierced my brain, jarring me to consciousness.
The blackness was filled with noise, screeches, howls, yips, barks, grunts, and
unintelligible noises. It took my brain a moment to focus, and then I
remembered where I was. The guttural explosion of noise went on, but there was
no firing, so I finally decided that we were not under attack, but I could not
figure out what the ungodly racket was. The radio was humming by then and
Captain Miller was soon querying me as to what the hell was going on. The noise
wasn?t far from where I huddled in my little depression. It was coming from my
platoons sector, and although it didn?t sound human, it was probably coming from
one of my men.
I grabbed my interpreter and radio operator and we
scurried toward the source of the clamor through the blackness. About half way
to the position I suddenly remembered the mines. My stomach rolled and my
sphincter tightened perceptibly, but there was nothing for it but to keep
going. The source of noise had to be found out. A huddle of figures appeared
out of the blackness. One was Hawkins, he had gotten there already, and the
others were Nung. One of them was thrashing and flailing on the ground, and the
unintelligible panoply of noise emanated from his writhing body. I chanced a
quick look with my red lens covered flashlight. The man?s face was contorted
and his eyes had rolled back in his head. It looked like he might have been
having an epileptic fit. I demanded the interpreter find out what the hell was
going on to no avail. All we could do was hold down the flailing body to keep
the man from injuring himself.
It seemed like a long time, but it was probably no more
than five minutes, until the man stopped the flailing and noise. There was a
huddled whispering in Vietnamese as the Nungs sorted things out and then my
interpreter was back with me. It seems that what I had witnessed was a Buddhist
version of speaking in tongues. The Nung was a Buddha talker. When the man had
regained his composure he told the others that he had talked to Buddha and that
Buddha had told him that there were many NVA in the area and that there was
going to be more fighting. Now, I could have told them that without talking to
Buddha, but to the Nungs, this was a very spiritual happening, and it had a
noticeable effect on them.
The Nungs were a peculiar people. They were Vietnamese,
but they stubbornly hung on to their Chinese heritage even though they had lived
in Vietnam for several generation. They didn?t look unlike the typical
Vietnamese, except on the whole they tended to be a little shorter and thinner.
They were proud of their ethnic minority status, and they were devoutly
Buddhist. After the Buddha talking incident, I had to keep sending my
interpreter out to make them put out the Buddha incense sticks that they
started. Some Americans did not trust the Nungs, perhaps for good reason. I
had Nungs in my platoon who openly expressed sympathy for the North Vietnamese
cause, but they decided to fight for us rather than the NVA or the South
Vietnamese Army because we paid a hell of a lot better. There was one old Nung
in the company who was to old to go on operations so we just used him as a
houseboy. He had fought for the French, in France, during World War I. Another
Nung in my platoon was about 35 years old. He had fought at Dien Bien Phu, with
the other side. The youngest was a 14-year-old boy who wasn?t much bigger than
his M-16 rifle. I kept him near me most of the time.
The morning of March 3rd was overcast and
dreary. Captain Miller called Bobby Blatherwick and myself to his position to
lay out the planned movement of the Task Force, which was to move out shortly.
B Company would take the lead in column of platoons and move east along the
ridge. My platoon would follow B Company and Bobby?s platoon would bring up the
rear. As Captain Miller talked I heard a sharp pop from the direction of my
platoon?s position, followed by shouts and a commotion. We all knew immediately
that someone had stepped on another toe popper mine. Sure enough, another of my
Nungs had been crippled by one of those hidden hideous devices. I was now back
down to twenty-five combat effectives in my platoon, including myself, having
lost two men to those mines.
Of course this latest circumstance put the Task Force
operation on hold as a medevac had to be called for the wounded Nung. Again,
the weather was lousy and it was late afternoon before a helicopter finally made
it in to evacuate the wounded man. Most of the day had been lost so Major
Moore decided that the task force would stay another night where we were and
move out first thing in the morning.
I said earlier that my platoon was now down to
twenty-five combat effective men. That was problematic. We had now been in
Laos for seven days. Fear and adrenaline had kept us on an edge for most of
that time, but now we were no longer alone. When we had linked up with the Task
Force we had been engulfed in a blanket of security and safety that most of us
had all but given up on. The adrenaline was no longer pumping and that left us
in a down of near lethargy abetted by physical exhaustion, dehydration and
malnourishment. When I think back on it, at that point we really weren?t worth
a damn. I would find out in the days to come though that fear is much stronger
than debilitation, and that human beings can endure far more than we sometimes
think.
Buddha spoke again that night. The message was the same,
but the maniacal thrashing and howling of my Buddha talking Nung was no longer a
cultural novelty. Captain Miller got me on the radio, chewed my ass out, and
told me to get my people under control. Fortunately, Buddha didn?t have a long
conversation that night, but I still had to chase the odor of smoldering Buddha
sticks until dawn.
We moved out shortly after dawn on the 4th of
March. The task force was moving east along the mountain ridge toward the
northern end of the Ashau Valley. Movement was slow and cautious. We were a
force to contend with now, but every one of us knew that this was the bad guys
back yard and that there were still lots more of them than there were of us.
Evidence of that fact was apparent. We followed well-worn trails that were
sometimes as wide as country roads. B Company soon found a cache of rice, they
found several that day. They were probably bags of rice stacked under thatch
shelters, but by the time my platoon passed them they were smoldering, black,
lumpy piles of unrecognizable fodder that filled my nostrils with the stench of
putrid sulfur. B Company had destroyed each cache with white phosphorous
grenades.
The flora changed as we moved east. We were soon out of
triple canopy rain forest and spent most of the day moving through lower growth
forest with frequent open areas of high grass and small trees. Most of the time
I was able to keep flank security well out from the main column with intervals
of thick brush forcing them back in on the platoon. The weather cleared and a
warm afternoon sun brightened an azure sky.
In mid afternoon, the task force came to a point where
the mountain ridge split. We had been gradually loosing elevation for a couple
of hours, and now one ridgeline to the front dropped off gradually to the east,
the way we had been moving, and another forked off to the southeast. Major
Moore decided to follow the ridge down to the southeast, why, I don?t know. At
that point I was just a platoon leader in a battalion size task force, and not
privy to discussions and decisions made at the Task Force level. Undoubtedly,
Major Moore was in contact with higher headquarters and was receiving
intelligence and direction on what we were supposed to do and where we were
supposed to go. At least I hoped so.
About an hour before dark we moved into a perimeter to
RON. Bobby?s Platoon and mine closed the back door with my platoon settling in
from the center of the ridge south and east to where we tied in with a platoon
from B Company, and Bobby securing an arc to the north and east to another B
Company platoon. We were in a relatively level area of young forest with most
of the trees about ten inches in diameter and not too much brush. I checked
each position paying special attention to the placement of the M-60 machine guns
to insure that they could provide protective grazing fire across our platoon
front. That night we would be on fifty percent alert with one man always awake
in each two-man position. Then I broke out my last ration and used the last of
my water to prepare it. If I remember right, it was a PIR, the Vietnamese
equivalent of a long range patrol ration. I think it was shrimp and mushrooms
and of course rice. That was the fifth meal I had eaten in the last eight days.
It would be a long time before I would eat again.
Again the black Laotian night was fractured by the wails,
shrieks, howls, yips and grunts of Buddha speaking. Captain Miller?s patience
was at an end. He called me and told me that if I couldn?t control my people,
he would replace me with someone who could. I had just about made up my mind
that I was going to cut that son of a bitch?s throat so he could talk to Buddha
in person, and I let the Nungs know it. The last eight days had hardened me
into a person that I didn?t even know, and I think I really would have done it.
I think the Nungs thought so too, because the clamor stopped as suddenly as it
had begun. It didn?t take long though, for the word to spread, not only through
my platoon, but through the whole task force, that Buddha had passed on a grave
and foreboding message. The Buddha talker said that a division of NVA now
surrounded us and that the morrow would bring much death and destruction. There
were no smoldering Buddha sticks to contend with that night, but I could feel,
and smell, the fear that permeated the indigenous troops. Hell, I was scared
too.
I don?t know whether Buddha?s visit had anything to do
with it or not, but when morning came on March 5th the Task Force?s
direction of movement was changed. We reversed course and moved out in the
direction that we had come from. One of the two recon teams with the Task Force
took the point followed by Bobby?s platoon, then my platoon, and then B
Company. We followed our back trail all morning without incident, then, early
in the afternoon we found a wide ridge dropping off to the north and started
down it.
The weather had cleared and we moved under a bright blue
sky. It was warm, but not uncomfortable. It would have been a lazy walk in the
sun except that every man was super alert and on a keen edge, knowing in the
back of his mind that today he would see the elephant. Then the elephant
appeared.
It began with a burst of fire, and confusion. Captain
Miller was on the radio trying to contact Bobby to see what was happening, but
couldn?t raise him. Bobby?s platoon sergeant, SFC Hall, answered Captain Miller
that another cache had been found and that Bobby was probably destroying it. I
knew better. That burst of fire had come from an RPD. I recognized that sound
now with a certainty. Then up ahead the jungle exploded in the crescendo of a
full-fledged firefight. Where I was, the ridge had narrowed somewhat and to my
right it dropped off into a small heavily wooded gully. Up ahead I could see
that the ridge widened out again and seemed to level off a little. We were in
mature forest with relatively thick underbrush. The Nung in front of me
suddenly pointed his M-16 into the gully to our right and fired a burst on
automatic. There was nothing there. This was the fourteen year old that I kept
near me and he had simply fired his weapon out of excitement and because he
hadn?t had the opportunity to shoot prior to then. Then everything became a
blur, with stark images interspaced that have stayed with me to this day.
Noise! Bobby on the radio. Recon Team ambushed. Noise!
Bobby??I?m flanking right, send Burns left?. Hawkins with me. I shout at
him??Two squads left on line, one follow?. Noise! Crashing through brush.
Running. Can?t see my squads. Noise! Movement to my right?it?s Bobby?s
people. Running. In the open now. Noise! There?s Bobby. Waving his arms at
me, what?s he saying? He has a grenade in his hand. Pointing ahead. Noise!
Scattered trees. Open grassy forest floor. Things scattered on the ground.
They are bodies. Not moving. Noise! Somewhere to my left shooting..my
people. Running. Big tree down about fifty meters ahead. Bobby?s pointing.
Noise! He?s pointing at the log up front. Holds up the grenade. I rip at the
tape securing the grenade on my left web gear strap. It?s in my hand I yank on
the pin. Running. Noise! Bodies on the ground. They our ours. Please don?t
shoot our own men!! Noise! A figure to my right. It?s Sandy Jones. Why is he
sitting there? Legs sprawled. Arms flailed. Hands on the ground. Palms up.
Brownish splotches etched up his right leg?right side?right chest?lip split to
his nose. He?s propped against his backpack. Dirty blond hair whisping from
under his boonie hat. Staring at me. Left eye wide-open?surprised?right
eyelid drooping over half open eye. He doesn?t see me. He doesn?t see
anything. A Nung on the ground to my left. Not moving. Head looks funny.
Where is it? Half gone. White stuff bulging out?its his brain?no blood.
Another shape to my left. It?s Himes. He?s on the recon team. Prone
position. Car 15 aimed to the front?finger on the trigger. Why doesn?t he
shoot? Why doesn?t he move? He?ll never move again. Running. NO NOISE!! Just
ragged breathing..gasping really..mine. A blur on my right. It?s Bobby. We
are both falling. Not falling..jumping. My chest hits earth. I slide up to
the log. Bobby slides up beside me. I do not throw my grenade.
It was over. I was completely numb, and thirsty. Very,
very thirsty, but I had no water. On the other side of the log there lay an NVA
pith helmet and an AK-47 assault rifle. There was no other evidence that the
enemy had been there. Except for the bodies, ours. I can?t remember exactly
how many men were killed and wounded, but Sandy Jones and Earl Himes were dead
and some of the SCU. Every man on the recon team was killed or wounded. From
Bobby?s platoon Sandy was dead and one of the Nungs in his squad was seriously
wounded. Sandy had gone to the sound of the guns. He had led his squad in a
headlong charge straight down the ridge. The RPD had stopped him about thirty
meters short of the big log. That charge probably saved the lives of those on
the Recon Team who survived. Surprisingly, the Nung with his skull blown off
would live. He would come back to CCN at Marble Mountain with a flap of skin
sewn over his brain and continue to serve on the payroll as a houseboy or some
such. That was the way things were, we kept the faith with those who fought
with us.
Nobody in my platoon had been hit. I took stock of
myself and it wasn?t a pretty sight. Blood was running down my right leg and my
trousers had been ripped open from mid-thigh to the cuff. It was not a wound;
rather I had ripped open my pants and gouged myself in the leg running through
the brush. My platoon had been in Laos now for nine days and I was dirty,
unshaven and stank. I?d only had five meals during that time and had suffered
from dehydration much of the time. I was loosing weight and it was starting to
show. In fact, before this was all over I would drop from 170 pounds to 135.
What is important about all of this is that I was not unique. Every man in my
platoon, except for the six who had rejoined us when we linked up with the task
force, looked and stank just like me. We had now been through three firefights
with the NVA, endured a Prairie Fire, had no more food or water and were
starting to get short on ammunition. We were not yet combat ineffective, but we
were headed in that direction. Still, nobody had given up. They were not
giving up now and they would not give up in the ordeals they were destined yet
to endure. I was hungry, thirsty, exhausted and scared shitless, but another
feeling began to emerge from the recesses of my numb mind?.Pride! These men, my
men, had, like Sandy Jones, gone to the sound of the guns. They had deployed
and advanced into the fire and the enemy had been driven back. It was none of
my doing. It was the raw courage and tenacity of those Nungs, my Nungs, and the
professional leadership of determined American NCO?s like Hawkins and Gray and
Lee and others, who ,God forgive me, I can?t remember their names. These were
men, my men, and they were soldiers.
We immediately began to establish a defensive perimeter
and prepare an LZ so the dead and wounded could be evacuated. Behind me the
terrain was relatively level, slopping gently up the ridge to the south. The
eastern side of the ridge was quite open, just a few scattered small trees to
bring down to make a good one ship LZ. There it opened up completely to a field
of tall grass that dropped steeply to the east. The field was about 150 meters
wide and ended abruptly at a heavily wooded ridge, which rose steeply to the
east of us. That ridgeline ran north and south and curled up to our position
about 150 meters to the south. To the northeast a couple of hundred meters the
field dropped over the horizon offering a panoramic view of Vietnam far to the
north. If I hadn?t been so scared out of my mind at the time, I may have
appreciated the beautiful view. Sometime while we were there, Bobby took some
pictures of a sunrise from that spot. I still have two of those prints in a
dilapidated old scrapbook. The south portion of our perimeter was heavily
wooded and thick with undergrowth. That was the stuff we had just attacked
through. To the west the trees were smaller and the forest floor was relatively
open, the terrain dropping down to a wooded bowl and rising again somewhere to
the west. The log I had ended up at was on the crest of the ridgeline we had
come down. The ridge was about 75 meters wide at that point and ran gently down
to the north through open forest.
Bobby?s platoon had taken casualties so Captain Miller
pulled his platoon back and gave them the western portion of the perimeter. My
platoon was given responsibility for the northern portion of the perimeter back
around to the LZ. B Company secured the LZ and the southern half of the
perimeter. Some people were gathering the casualties and preparing them for
evacuation. Others worked at clearing the LZ. I?m sure I remember that the
Task Force registered artillery from Cunningham during that time. That is,
artillery rounds were called in until one exploded at a point satisfactory to
adjust from if a fire mission were needed in a hurry. The rest of us dug in as
best we could. The ground was rock hard but after an hour or so I had managed
to scratch, claw and dig with a K-Bar knife and my canteen cup, a rifle pit
about six or eight inches deep and the length of my body. God I was thirsty.
A CH-46 or CH-47 arrived late in the afternoon to pick up
the casualties. I caught a glimpse of men carrying shapeless forms wrapped in
ponchos toward the LZ but averted my eyes. I couldn?t bear to look. Captain
Miller called a counsel of war with Bobby and me to give us our orders on
continuing the operation. It was too late to do much that night, but the next
morning we were to move out again to the north with my platoon leading. I
whined and carped a little about the bad shape my platoon was in and that B
Company, which had taken no casualties yet, should be taking the point. I can?t
remember all the reasons Captain Miller gave me, maybe it was that B Company
being newly organized was untested or maybe it was simply because my platoon was
already on the north side of the perimeter, whatever it was, I had my orders so
it was yes sir, yes sir, three bags full and I was back with my platoon briefing
Hawkins and the squad leaders on the morrows plans. Hawkins had already
redistributed our remaining ammunition and insured that our machine guns were
properly placed to achieve maximum grazing fire on the ridge to our north. As
we layed out our plans we all chewed on bamboo, everyone was out of water, but
it didn?t help much. We were out of food too, but nobody thought too much about
that at the time. God I was thirsty!
As dawn approached on the 6th we stood to, but
things remained quiet and the NVA did not attack. We were to move out at about
8:00AM and quietly readied ourselves to do so. About thirty minutes prior to
moving out I had the erg to relieve myself. I cannot remember having defecated
once during the previous ten days, although that is something someone normally
doesn?t dwell on. I would remember this time. Since we were going to move out
soon, I wasn?t too concerned about relieving myself in the proximity of my
position so I only moved about ten or twenty feet away and scraped out a shallow
cat hole. I laid a packet of toilet paper on the ground in front of me,
stripped down my ragged torn trousers and squatted over the cat hole. I wasn?t
wearing undershorts, old timers had told me that wearing underwear contributed
to jungle rot, but as ragged as my pants were, I wish that I had. I was
constipated and it took some effort, but everything finally came out. I reached
forward to retrieve my packet of toilet paper and the world exploded.
Noise! Falling forward. Face down in the earth. Noise!
Trying to jerk up my pants as I slither toward my hole. Noise! Where?s my
rifle? I?ve got it. I?m in my hole. Hope I don?t have shit all over my pants.
Noise! It?s starting to become recognizable now. RPD?s, AK?s, B-40?s exploding
in the perimeter, behind me, filling the air with invisible, deadly, tiny
shards. Those menacing, evil rocket propelled grenades were seemingly busting
everywhere. M-16?s, M-60?s and M-79 grenade launchers joining the maelstrom of
noise. Frantically searching the slope to my front. Nothing. All the noise
coming from behind me. B Company under attack. NVA firing from the ridge east
of the LZ. Heavy attack from the south. Noise! Can?t do anything. Nothing to
shoot at. Nothing to my front. Everything behind me. My ass cheeks clenched
tight anticipating a 7.62 round or shrapnel from those godforsaken rockets to
violate me. Scared beyond reason. Nothing I can do but lie there and try to
make myself as small as possible. Radio crackling. Captain Miller on the
horn. ?Keep your heads down, artillery coming in. DANGER CLOSE!? Giant
eruptions of noise on the south side of the perimeter. Danger close my ass!
Danger close is supposed to be 150 meters, this stuff is right on us. The
horrendous roar of exploding 155 rounds, enveloping, permeating. SILENCE!! I
claw at the K-Bar knife strapped upside down on my left web gear strap and start
scraping my hole deeper, which until now I had not thought possible. God I was
thirsty.
It was over. Major Moore?s registration of the artillery
the night before had paid off. The 155?s from Cunningham had broken up the NVA
attack. We would not be moving out that morning. There were new casualties to
evacuate. I do not remember how many men were wounded, none from my platoon,
although I don?t know how we escaped all the steel that filled the air, but some
had been wounded in B Company.
The weather was shitty again and we had all but given up
on getting a medevac helicopter in, but late in the morning the unmistakable
whop-whop-whop of a UH- 1 penetrated the jungle perimeter and the bird emerged
from the gray overcast. We were all surprised when the chopper landed and out
jumped Phil Bauso. Not only had Phil talked the medevac into attempting the
mission, he had talked himself onto it and, God bless him, he had brought along
five 5 gallon jerry cans of beautiful, wonderful, marvelous WATER! Phil had
returned from R&R and finding his platoon gone had finagled his way up the MLT-2
and finally onto the Laotian mountain ridge where our Task Force was surrounded
by a large NVA force. With Phil back with his platoon, Bobby Blatherwick now
went up to assist in any way he could on Major Moore?s staff.
I was really in the dark about the enemy situation, but
at the task force level, I think Major Moore was receiving quite a bit of
intelligence on the enemy. One of the sources was Captain Dick Meadows. Dick
was one of those Special Forces legends whose actual accomplishments were even
greater than the legend. At the time he was operations officer in OP-34 at Camp
Fay. That was the part of SOG that sent agents into North Vietnam. All of
those agent teams disappeared not to reemerge until the l990?s when they were
finally released from communist imprisonment and the United States reluctantly
admitted that they had been part of SOG. By 1969, teams were no longer being
sent into North Vietnam because of their obvious compromise, but other teams,
including STRATA, PIKE HILL and EARTH ANGEL teams were being employed in Laos,
Cambodia and the DMZ. These teams were supposed to be all indigenous and wore
enemy uniforms and often moved openly on the enemy roads and trails. That?s why
we called them roadrunners. No Americans were supposed to be in with them, but
when Task Force Moore was deployed to bail my platoon out, a STRATA or EARTH
ANGEL or some kind of team, I?m not sure which, was inserted a couple of klicks
to the east of us and Dick Meadows went in with them. Dick?s team had worked
their way north, off the mountain ridge toward the border and had captured a
prisoner. That may have been where the information came from that an enemy
battalion size bunker complex lay to the north of our current position. Dick
and his team eventually walked out of Laos and linked up with the Marines.
Wherever the information came from, Major Moore now gave
Captain Miller the order to attack north toward the bunker complex with two
platoons abreast and in column, with B Company following in support. Early that
afternoon, the 6th of March, Captain Miller called me to meet with
him on the LZ so we could discuss the mission. I met Captain Miller on the west
side of the LZ and for some reason that I can?t remember we started walking
across the LZ as he talked to me. The sun had finally broken through the
overcast and a bright blue sky was opening up. I was walking to Captain
Miller?s left and slightly behind him. Various activities were taking place
around the LZ, some men working on clearing the LZ out some more, and others
improving their fighting position. One of these was a SCU from B Company who
was scraping out a deeper hole on the south side of the LZ. He was an M-79
gunner and had leaned his M-79 grenade launcher against a stump while he
worked. Out of the corner of my eye I saw the M-79 slowly slip from its perch
and slide to the ground. It was like I was watching everything in slow motion.
I froze in mid stride as Captain Miller took another step. The M-79 fell to the
ground, bounced, and the unmistakable hollow ?THOOOMP? of the round discharging
reverberated through my head. The M-79 was like a big sawed off shotgun. It
fired a 40 millimeter projectile at such a slow velocity that the gunner could
watch the projectile arc its way toward its target. I never dreamed that
someone on the receiving end could also watch the projectile come at him, but
there it was, that goldish green object coming straight at Captain Miller and
myself. I didn?t have time to move, to yell, to shit, to pray, nothing, and
then it passed between us and an instant later splashed against the vegetation
on the north side of the LZ with a thunderous explosion sending thousands of
steel shards splaying into my platoons sector.
Life isn?t fair. We had survived a full scale NVA attack
with rocket rounds exploding all around us and bullets filling the air, and not
a man in my platoon had been scratched. Now a stupid accidental discharge of
one of our own weapons and seven men in my platoon, including my interpreter,
were wounded. I was now down to 18 combat effective men in my platoon. Again
the wounded had to be evacuated. The weather had cleared so we soon had a
medevac in for the wounded men, but much to our disappointment there was no
resupply.
It wasn?t long after the helicopters left, about 5:00PM
when they hit us again. It never gets any better! Again, the noise, unbearable
noise, and unmitigated fear as my world erupted around me. The B-40?s exploding,
the AK and RPD rounds cracking, the M-16?s, 60?s, and 79?s responding.
Everything coming from the B Company side, nothing to shoot at, nothing to do
except lie there, my hole was noticeably deeper now, and wait for one of those
pieces of metal to find me. DANGER CLOSE! The 155?s ripping into the jungle,
and SILENCE!
There was no more talk of attacking after that. We had
wounded again and unless we were resupplied soon with ammunition, food, water,
and men, we were not going anywhere, maybe forever. I tried not to think about
that.
Dawn and stand to on March 7th came and went
but hopes of resupply were dashed by the overcast. I drank the last of my
water. I?d made a canteen last since the morning before and I was still god
awful thirsty. Then they hit us again. It was about 8:00AM, almost like the
NVA were on a clock. Again what seemed like endless roaring carnage raged on
that Laotian hillside and again it ended. Those attacks seemed to go on
forever, but in reality, I don?t think any of them lasted more than 5 to 10
minutes. It?s surprising how much terror can be crammed into five or ten
minutes.
I really don?t know why, but someone up the chain of
command then decided that we were going to be resupplied by parachute airdrop.
Sometime during the day a Blackbird, (C-130 or C123, I don?t remember which)
made the futile attempt. The bird came in and on a best guess the crew kicked
out the bundles, the parachutes opened, and we all helplessly watched as the
bullets, food, and precious WATER drifted east across the LZ , across the grassy
field and into the edge of the NVA controlled ridgeline. One bundle landed in
the grassy field just short of the wooded ridge, but there was no thought to go
and get it by either the NVA or us. God I was thirsty!
They hit us again about 5:00PM. You feel so helpless
when you can?t even shoot back. Scared to death as I was, I now prayed that we
would be ordered to move out. I didn?t relish the thought of just waiting
there, starving and dying of thirst, for the NVA to finally bleed us out of
ammunition and overrun us, or for some stray piece of metal to find me. In the
silence following the attack I stared down the ridge. Through the open forest,
with little undergrowth, I could see about a hundred meters. What was beyond
that? The NVA? Water? Salvation? I had a nearly uncontrollable erg to walk
out there and find out. I didn?t sleep that night. Starkly vivid images kept
me company. An image of an impish Nung with a wide smile and a quick laugh
lying face down in a remote jungle rivulet, the flesh already sloughing off his
ivory bronze skull. A robust young man, blondish hair whisping across his
forehead, vacant eyes pleading, lip split in an eternal, obscene grin. A
faceless SCU, his skullcap gone and his brain bulging out. These were unusually
clear images that kept me company that night. They would visit me more often in
the days and months ahead.
March 8th; the NVA were right on schedule.
The firestorm came at 8:00 AM. Again B Company took the brunt of the attack.
They had to be getting very low on ammunition, although I think we did
redistribute ammunition at some point. Then apparent salvation appeared.
General Stilwell at I Corps recognized the futility of leaving the Task Force on
the ground, and rather than resupply he ordered that all efforts be made to
extract the force. About mid-morning the overcast lifted and the helicopters
were inbound. Because the weather was so unpredictable and there were a
limited number of helicopters, the plan was to extract one platoon at a time and
take them just over the border into Vietnam until the entire Task Force was out
and then shuttle them from the new LZ back to Quang Tri. A Company was to go
out first and my platoon was designated as the first element to be extracted.
Since we were going to an unsecured LZ, I went out on the first UH-1 in case we
had to fight for our new real estate. My gut was in a knot as I climbed on
board the UH-l. We would be going out low and right over the ridge where all
the NVA attacks had come from. Gun ships hovered in the area to provide
suppressive fire, but I still had visions of my helicopter being shot from the
sky and dying a fiery death in twisted metal. Then we were off the ground, the
helicopter banking and turning sharply, picking up speed and sailing down the
mountain toward South Vietnam.
The commitment of a force as large as Task Force Moore
was very unusual for SOG. SOG?s mission, and especially OP-35?s, was primarily
to gather intelligence. The primary agent to accomplish that mission was the
Recon Team. The Hatchet Force was there to bail out a recon team if necessary
or to strike a target that a Recon Team uncovered. Most often that required
just a Hatchet Force Platoon or at most a Company. The only other time that a
larger than company size force was committed, that I know of, was for operation
Tail Wind in 1971, and I?m not sure that it was more than a company. That was
the one where in the mid 1990?s, CNN, Peter Arnett and Time Magazine claimed
that nerve gas was used and American defectors were targeted. Of course that
was a bunch of hogwash and CNN retracted, but the damage was done. The point is
there just weren?t enough helicopter lift assets committed to SOG to support a
battalion size force, and that became very clear as the attempt was made to
extract Task Force Moore.
The LZ that we were going to was located about a
kilometer and a half east of Cunningham Fire Support Base. As we circled to
come on final approach I got a good look at the place. It was a long narrow
hilltop about 50 meters wide and 150 to 200 meters long running north to south.
It was fairly devoid of vegetation, just low scrub, so I could see that there
was no threat of hostile forces on the LZ. If there were any threat it would be
long range from another of the numerous hilltops in the area. My platoon landed
and we quickly fanned out to secure the LZ for the rest of the lifts. Phil?s
platoon with the rest of A Company and Captain Miller arrived about 30 minutes
later, but that was it. Apparently the NVA struck again as the attempt was made
to get B Company out. Captain Gary Jones was slightly wounded during the attack
and a helicopter did get in to evacuate him. Major Moore came out too, but the
rest of company, and Bobby Blatherwick, were left on that Laotian ridge. The
weather closed in again and they would not get out until the next day. Bobby
never talked to me about it, but I can imagine the terror that those soldiers
must have felt to be left there, nearly out of ammunition and without food and
water, to face an enemy that had been regularly attacking a much larger and
stronger force. When they did come out they would not join us, but were taken
straight back to MLT-2. Captain Jones and Major Moore did not join us either.
They were taken to Cunningham, and then on to MLT-2. The rest of us, the
tattered remnant of A Company had been deposited on that god forsaken barren
hilltop and there we would remain, as if forgotten by the world.
The next seven days are kind of foggy to me. We had no
food or water and there was no attempt to get us any or to get us out. At some
point I sent out a patrol and they did find water. It was just a trickle of
moisture, a spring, which could fill a canteen in about five minutes. It wasn?t
much, but I am convinced that several of us would have died of dehydration had
it not been found. The spring was a couple of hundred meter down the northeast
side of our hill, and every day we would send out a patrol with a bunch of
canteens to patiently lie and fill them from that little trickle. The day
before we finally got out the water patrol was so weak that they had to crawl
back up to our position.
The effect of starvation was subtler. When we arrived at
that hill, my platoon had been on the ground since February 25th,
twelve days earlier. I?d only had five ration meals during that time and had
not eaten anything for the last five days. The rest of my platoon was in the
same condition. We had passed the point of feeling hunger. Now our bodies were
living off themselves. The weakness is what I remember most. Every day that
went by we got weaker, until in the end some of the men couldn?t even stand and
had to be carried to the helicopters that finally came to get us. At least we
didn?t have to dig in. Some unit had used this hilltop for a defensive position
in the last month or so. It had to be the marines, there were empty c-ration
cans scattered all over. More importantly there were foxholes and fighting
positions all over the hill, so we just took them over. My platoon had
responsibility for the northern end of the hill. In desperation we tried eating
bushes, grass, anything. We did find a root, looked sort of like a shriveled
sweet potato. I can?t remember what the stalk of the plant looked like, but
they were plentiful, easy to find and dig up. We baked them, boiled them, ate
them raw, any way we could. The problem was that they were so starchy that
after eating them for a day or two, the inside of our mouths cracked open and
bled and it hurt so bad that we couldn?t eat any more. There probably wasn?t
any nutrition in them anyway because we just continued to get weaker. Then
again, maybe that is what kept us alive. On the fifth day that we were there
one of my squad leaders finally went over the edge of that very fine line
between struggling to survive and giving up. I found him curled up in the fetal
position, alive, but totally unresponsive, in a hollow under a fallen log. He
wouldn?t talk, wouldn?t drink, wouldn?t eat the roots, or acknowledge us in any
way. I?m sure that if we had not been evacuated when we were, he would have
died where he lay within another day.
What was truly frustrating is that we were within sight
of salvation. Cunningham was clearly visible little more than a mile to the
west. It looked like a large flat topped green ant hill that someone had kicked
open on top, exposing a red top with hundreds of little ants scurrying all over
the place. We had not been delivered to the firebase, I?m sure, because of our
indigenous SCU. Cunningham had been overrun a few weeks before and the
survivors had only retaken the hill by leveling the 155mm cannons any using
beehive rounds, something like a 155 millimeter shotgun shell filled with
shredded steel, to repel the NVA. They didn?t want anyone who didn?t have round
eyes near them. I think our fallback plan was to walk to the base if things got
too desperate, but I believe we waited until we were past the point of
physically being able to do so.
At some point near the end of our ordeal, Captain Miller
told me that he was getting information that the SCU were talking about mutiny.
They were desperate, as we all were, but I don?t believe any of them seriously
considered mutiny. It didn?t make sense. Where would they go? What would they
do? If they did mutiny and then tried to go to Cunningham they would have been
shot down like dogs in the wire. If they tried to go back into Laos and join
the NVA, a more horrible fate probably awaited them. The NVA had a bounty on
all of our heads, American and SCU alike. We had crossed their palms with
American silver and they had accepted. If they tried to walk out to the coast
they had to traverse forty or fifty miles of inhospitable jungle mountains,
dodging marines and NVA all the way. No! I am convinced that those men would
have stayed there with us until we were all dead or we were rescued, whichever
came first.
On the seventh day, the 14th of March, God and
the U.S. Marine Corps came to our salvation. The overcast had finally lifted
and the marines on Cunningham sent over a helicopter with cases of c-rations and
water. They don?t make them anymore, but for the rest of my life, I will always
remember that my most relished meal was the ham and lima beans in an olive drab
can that I ate that morning. I hadn?t even finished that beautiful meal when
Captain Miller got hold of me and told me to hat up because helicopters were
inbound to pick us up. Its kind of corny, but I asked Captain Miller if I could
take the last chopper out. I had been the first man on the ground eighteen days
before and I wanted to be the last one out. He understood and said OK.
If I remember right, it took more than one lift to get us
out, and Captain Miller went out with the first lift to make sure that MLT-2 was
prepared to receive and care for our men. Finally everyone was picked up and I
crawled on board the last UH-l, we rose, banked and sped across the war torn
landscape to the north. We were taken first to Khe Sanh where we had to
disembark and wait for the helicopters to refuel, and then we were off again to
MLT-2 at Quang Tri. When we arrived, Captain Miller was already gone, called
down to CCN, I assumed for debriefing. He had left instructions for me to catch
the next available aircraft to Danang and return to CCN for debriefing. My
platoon would be housed and taken care of at MLT-2 until airlift could be
arranged back to CCN.
While I waited for a ride, I couldn?t help overhearing
guarded conversations from various people in the area. I felt like I was going
to be sick to my stomach. ?A Company had fallen apart; mission a failure; the
Nungs had balked at advancing when the recon team was ambushed; the company had
refused to advance when ordered to continue the mission; many of the Nungs were
medevaced for self-inflicted wounds? It was wrong. I couldn?t believe what I
was hearing. I had to get back to CCN and get this straightened out. This was
all horribly, horribly wrong.
Finally I was able to hitch a ride on one of CCN?s
CH-34?s, so I would be taken directly back to CCN and not have to find another
ride from the airbase at Danang. My mind whirled as we flew back. We dropped
down from the mountains north of Danang and flew low across the bay approaching
the city. I sat in the door hypnotized by the rippling water that we skimmed
across. I had to get back and get this terrible injustice corrected. There
were 59 casualties from this operation scattered all over Southeast Asia.
Seventeen of them, nearly a third, were from my platoon. They couldn?t have
paid that price in vain. Surely what I had heard was just idle misinformed
gossip. I would go to the command bunker for debriefing and everything would be
all right. Captain Miller probably had it straightened out already. Then we
climbed to pass high over the city, over the NSA hospital, and then Marble
Mountain was in sight, those green-spattered brilliant white limestone
protuberances that stood like sentinels casting a shadow over the CCN Compound.
Then we were on approach to the PSP landing pad just inside the gate of the
compound. The corrugated steel PSP did a reasonable job of keeping the blowing
sand at a minimum, and then I was off the bird and it rose, banked and sailed to
the north.
The compound looked and felt deserted. Nothing was
moving, no person in sight. I walked up the dusty road; turned right on the
boardwalk in front of the clapboard sided S-1 shop, headed toward the squatty
concrete command bunker and gained entrance. ?What are you doing here?? ? I
was ordered here for my debriefing.? ?Nobody sent for you, we completed
debriefing your mission last week. The after action report has already been
completed and sent down to Saigon. You look like shit, you better go get
cleaned up.? My bowels felt like they were filled with water. I turned and
stumbled out.
I left the boardwalk and shuffled across the sinking
sand, past the clapboard sandbagged latrine toward my hootch. My feet sent up
puffs of the fine light tan sand that swirled around me in the breeze that also
blew my ragged right pants leg away from my scrawny, chalky, naked leg. I was
numb. It was over. Captain Miller was going to take a fall and there was not a
damn thing I could do about it. Emotions flooded my brain. I felt confused. I
felt angry. I felt outraged. I felt helpless. I felt terribly alone. I
felt?. ashamed.
EPIOUGE
Captain Mike Miller did take the fall. He was relieved
of his command, given a career ending officer efficiency report and sent back to
Nha Trang. This injustice was partly overcome when several of us including
Major Jackie Deckard, former S3 of CCN and then Commander of MLT-2, wrote
statements supporting Captain Miller. Our appeals were successful and the bad
report was removed from Mike?s records. Mike finished his tour of duty as an
action officer in the II Corps Tactical Operations Center. He got out of the
active army in 1972, finished college and went to work for the Department of the
Interior where he is still employed as a GS-15. He remained in the Army
Reserves and retired as a Lieutenant Colonel. As for the success or failure of
the mission, here is what Mike Miller recently had to say about it. ? Whether we
were ultimately able to take any pressure off the marines is of course,
arguable. It cost a lot of casualties, and I have many times hoped that it was
worth it.?
Phil Bauso finished his tour shortly after we got back and went home. I don?t know what became of him, but I am sure he went back to lawyering. Bobby Blatherwick finished up his extended tour and also went home. I?ve heard through the grapevine that he went to medical school and became a doctor. Sanderfield Jones was awarded the Silver Star posthumously.
As for myself, I stayed with CCN. Following Dewey Canyon I spent ten days in the 95th EVAC Hospital with scrub typhus, then returned to the Hatchet Force. The company had been so devastated that it had to be reorganized. The surviving Nung?s were consolidated into two platoons and a third platoon of Bru Montagnards from Mai Loc was recruited. SFC Hawkins and I were given the new platoon to train and command. Vince Sabatinelli took over my old platoon and Pete McMurray took Bauso?s platoon after Phil went home. Both Vince and Pete were later killed. I went on two more operations with the Hatchet Force. One was an in country mission in Elephant Valley which was northwest of Danang. That was kind of a graduation exercise for my newly trained platoon under combat conditions. The platoon did well. The next mission was over the fence in Laos, back in the Ashau targets, this time AS-5. On that mission, my platoon was inserted on June 22nd where we joined Pete McMurray?s platoon, which had already been on the ground for a day with the Company Commander, Jim Storter. That was a fairly successful mission. For the next six days we were the baddest muthas in the valley, killed some NVA, captured a bunch of enemy weapons and documents and generally raised hell. After that I moved to the staff where I served my remaining five months as S1 of CCN. After Vietnam I decided to stay with the army and retired as a Colonel after twenty-seven years. The images still haven?t gone away.
Here is the truth from Ken Boyd: (Operaton Dewey Canyon, 1969)
Maj Moore, the S-2, was relieved from SOG after this operation because of incompetence. (I would call it cowardice) He extracted himself from this operation at the earliest possible moment and Chief SOG forced him fly resupply then relieved him. 1st Lt. Boyd received a head wound while standing over Cpt Jones’s fox hole requesting access to the radio. 1st LT Boyd realized that fire support was necessary even if some people were scared shitless. Cpt Gary Jones evacuated himself with a bullshit scratch to the side of his head. 1st Lt. Kenneth Boyd assumed command. While Major Shelton speaks of the dangers confronting the extracted CCS Company at the Marine Base he forgets that the CCN Company was left behind for four days without food, water, and with very little ammunition. This unit was constantly attacked by the NVA. A parachute resupply by C-130 was attempted. Two out of three drops ended up in enemy hands. Maj Moore was aboard that resupply. During the drops he continually implored the ground commander to tell him if they were taking fire. Confronting two very difficult situations: Near mutiny by the Bru mercenaries and near destruction by overwhelming NVA force; this small unit hung on until evacuated. During the evacuation both Sgt Mills and Lt. Boyd were again wounded. I get really tired of hearing how tough these guys from CCS had it after they were extracted to the Marine Base. They knew when they left at 5:00 in the afternoon that we (CCN Hatchet Force) were not getting out. There is not one person from our CNN Hatchet Force that does not feel like they bugged. Special recognition for this operation should be given to Sgt Rodney Headman, Sgt Mills, Lt Armstrong, SDU leaders Nhiue and Ralang (these guys kept us intact).
BTW: I didn’t exactly take these days off either.
Kenneth M. Boyd
Cpt 5th Special Forces Abn, SOA CCN
Sgt Rodney Headman got the Silver Star for this Operation, Sgt Mills got the Bronze Star – He deserved the Silver Star
I got two purple hearts an award from the Vietnamese.
PS: If you don't print this you should not to be a SOG site. Remember: BMTD Balls Make The Difference!
Questions: ken@33477.net